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XI. Trademark Infringement
A. Accounting of Profits-Maier Brewing Co. v.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d
117 (9th Cir. 1968).
Relying upon the theory of unjust enrichment, the Ninth Circuit
in Maier Brewing Company v. Fleischmann Distilling Corporation1
held that the lack of direct product competition did not prevent an
award of an accounting of profits in a trademark infringement suit.2
Fleischmann Distilling Corporation sought injunctive relief and
damages 3 for purported trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition against both Maier Brewing Company for manufacturing and
Ralph's Grocery Company for distributing beer under the label
"Black & White." Since 1948,4 Fleischmann Corporation has been the
sole importer and distributor for "Black & White" label Scotch
whisky, which is manufactured abroad by James Buchanan & Com-
pany.5 The name "Black & White" was registered as a trademark for
Scotch whisky in 1908 in the United States Patent Office 6 and was
renewed in 1948 under the Lanham Act.7  Sales have exceeded 100
million bottles in the United States,8 and, during the period from
1951 to 1957, over 500,000 cases were sold in California.9 Over
one-half of the sales in California were in Los Angeles County,
location of both Ralph's Grocery Company chain and Maier Brewing
Company.10  Maier Brewing Company manufactured and sold low
price beer under a variety of labels," one of which, "Black & White,"'12
1 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968).
2 390 F.2d at 124; see Note, An Accounting of Profits for Trade-Symbol
Infringement Based Upon a Theory of Restitution, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 243.
3 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 196 F. Supp. 401
(N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd, 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
4 The trial court indicated Fleischmann has been the sole importer
since 1938. 196 F. Supp. 401.
5 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 150
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).





11 Id. at 158 n.11 (21 separate labels).
12 The name "Black & White" had been used in 1935 by the St.
Claire Brewing Co. of San Jose, California, but after the threat of suit, the
name was abandoned in 1938. Id. at 153.
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was sold exclusively to Ralph's Grocery for use in their 32-store gro-
cery chain.13
Initially the trial court denied an injunction, holding that there
could be no real competition between the plaintiff's Scotch whisky
and the defendant's beer.14 The district court concluded that such a
lack of competition precluded any confusion as to the source of origin
of the product in the minds of consumers. On the first appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case and ordered the dis-
trict court to grant an injunction and to consider the plaintiff's right
to an accounting.' 5 The court found that there was a likelihood of
confusion in the minds of consumers as to who produced the product,16
and that Maier deliberately took advantage of the popularity of the
name "Black & White" Scotch.1'7 The instant appeal was from the
awarding of an accounting of profits against both Maier Brewing
Company and Ralph's Grocery Company.' 8
After determining that the district court properly exercised fed-
eral jurisdiction, 9 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the alter-
'3 Id. at 151.
14 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 196 F. Supp. 401
(N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd, 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
15 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
16 314 F.2d at 151. Determining the likelihood of confusion as to source
is more like determining a question of law than a finding of fact. E.g., Con-
tinente v. Continente, 378 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1967); Baker v. Simmons Co.,
307 F.2d 458, 464-65 (1st Cir. 1962); Sleeper Lounge Co. v. Bell Mfg. Co., 253
F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1958); McCormick & Co. v. Manischewitz Co., 206 F.2d
744, 746 (6th Cir. 1953); Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602,
602-03 (2d Cir. 1952).
17 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 157,
158 n.11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
18 A second appeal by the defendants from an award of attorney's fees
was dismissed as premature. A third appeal, taken by the defendants under
district court authorization before final judgment, reversed the awarding of
attorney's fees. Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 359 F.2d
156, 165 (9th Cir. 1966), afFd, 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
19 In a civil action arising under any federal statute relating to trade-
marks, the federal courts have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964). Infringe-
ment of common law trademarks not arising out of any Act of Congress re-
lated to trademarks does not confer federal jurisdiction over the case un-
less other requisites are met. E.g., Fry v. Layne-Western Co., 282 F.2d 97, 99
(8th Cir. 1960); Allen v. Barr, 196 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1952); Magic Foam
Sales Corp. v. Mystic Foam Corp., 167 F.2d 88, 90 (6th Cir. 1958). The Fed-
eral Trade-Mark Act (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964), provides
that federal courts have original and appellate jurisdiction for any actions aris-
ing under it. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). Therefore, notwithstanding the fact
the defendant's business was wholly intrastate, the court concluded it had
jurisdiction because the goods were used in commerce as defined in section
1127 of the Act. Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleisctnann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d
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native either of following the traditional view of granting an account-
ing only if there is direct product competition between the trade-
mark registrant and the infringer,20 or of adopting a modern view of
unjust enrichment and granting an accounting when in fact there
is no direct product competition. Therefore, the court, in deciding
which theory to follow, had to determine if the remedies available
under the Lanham Act,21 adopted to provide a uniform trademark
law for all owners of trademarks engaged in interstate commerce,22
were satisfactory in view of today's complex business conditions. The
Lanham Act provides: "When a violation ... [has] been estab-
lished in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall
be entitled ... subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) de-
fendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3)
the costs of the action.
'23
Historically, the applications of the remedies available under
the Lanham Act and its predecessor, the Trademark Act of 1905,24
have been far from satisfactory. The trademark registrant has always
had a remedy at law for damages for trademark infringement; how-
ever, this remedy has often proved to be inadequate.25 For this rea-
son, equity, in a proper case, has taken jurisdiction to provide an
adequate remedy for the trademark owner.26 In an equity proceed-
ing, there may be a suit for an injunction 27 and possibly a suit
for an accounting2s on the theory that the accounted for profits will
substitute for the owner's lost sales.29 However, in such equity ac-
117, 120 (9th Cir. 1968); accord, Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326
F.2d 87, 93-94 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 234 (1948).
20 This was the position of the Ninth Circuit previously. Horlick's
Malted Milk Corp. v. Horluck's, Inc., 59 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir. 1932); see Com-
ment, Monetary Awards for Unfair Competition in California, 34 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 283 (1961).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964).
22 See S. Rae. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Ses. 1-2 (1946).
23 15 US.C. § 1117 (1964).
24 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 593, § 19, 33 Stat. 724.
25 See, e.g., Simmons Co. v. Royal Bedding Co., 5 F. Supp. 946 (W.D.
Pa. 1933); 2 H. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAm Coi Pm.roN AND TRaDE-MAEMS
§ 423 (4th ed. 1947).
26 Midwest Plastics Corp v. Protective Closures Co., 285 F.2d 747 (10th
Cir. 1960); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 896,
(7th Cir. 1960); see American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d
446, 452 (6th Cir. 1942) (dictum).
27 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1964).
28 Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916); Na-
tional Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883,
(1955); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F.2d 708, 715,
718 (7th Cir. 1941).
29 See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
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tions, the granting of an injunction does not entitle the trade-
mark registrant to an accounting of profits as a matter of right.30 An
accounting is at the discretion of the courts' and will be denied if
injunctive relief satisfies the equities of the case.
3 2
Heretofore, a great majority of the cases decided under the trade-
mark laws have taken a very narrow interpretation of the remedy of
an accounting. The courts have limited such a recovery only to cases
where there has been direct competition between the trademark
owner and the infringer.33 This traditional view has been grounded
on the theory that in the absence of direct product competition there
could be no confusion as to the origin of noncompeting products, and,
therefore, no diversion of sales from the trademark owner.
3 4
Nevertheless, a minority of cases has circumvented the direct com-
petition requirement. First, some courts have allowed an accounting
where there was purchaser confusion as to the source of the product.
35
316 U.S. 203, 206 (1942); Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d
77, 83 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods.
Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 392 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966).
30 E.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947);
Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 293 F.2d 88, 95 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
253 F.2d 390, 394 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
31 E.g., Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d
389, 392 (2d Cir. 1965); National Van Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir.
1956); Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77, 83 (2d Cir.
1951), aff'g 94 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
32 E.g., Highway Cruisers, Inc. v. Security Indus., Inc., 374 F.2d 875, 876
(9th Cir. 1967); Fuller Prods. Co. v. Fuller Brush Co., 299 F.2d 772, 777 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962); Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley,
Inc., 293 F.2d 88, 96 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1962); National Van
Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1956); Consumers Petroleum Co. v.
Consumers Co., 169 F.2d 153, 164 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 902
(1949); see Comment, Monetary Awards for Unfair Competition in California,
34 S. CAL. L. REV. 283 (1961).
33 Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G.D. Searle & Co., 253 F.2d 390, 394 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); McCormick & Co. v. B. Manischewitz
Co., 206 F.2d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 1953); Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d
521 (2d Cir. 1953) (dictum); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d
969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1948); Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horluck's, Inc., 59
F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir. 1932); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 7 F.2d 962, 967
(3d Cir. 1925); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 513 (6th Cir.
1924), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 706 (1926).
34 E.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 7 F.2d 962, 967 (3d Cir. 1925);
Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 513 (6th Cir. 1924), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 706 (1926).
35 Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa.
1956); Lou Schneider, Inc. v. Carl Gutman & Co., 69 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y.
1946); see Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 149
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900 (1953).
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For example, in one case, 6 the court granted an accounting where
the defendant, by using the name "Admiral" on its vacuum cleaners
and sewing machines, induced prospective customers into believing
they were purchasing goods manufactured by Admiral Corporation.
However, Admiral Corporation, a producer of many household appli-
ances, did not make sewing machines or vacuum cleaners. In spite of
this fact, the court found that consumers were deceived into buying
goods thinking they were manufactured by someone other than their
true producer.
3 7
Secondly, some courts have evaded the direct competition require-
ment by finding that a lack of direct geographic competition does
not prevent an accounting.38 For example, in Maternally Yours, Inc.
v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc.,39 the Second Circuit granted an account-
ing of profits for sales in all five of the defendant's clothing stores,
even though the defendant was not directly competing with the
plaintiff's clothing stores in one market locality.40 The courts in
these geographic competition and confusion-as-to-source cases, while
not ignoring the direct competition requirement, seem to have based
recovery 41 on the equitable principle of unjust enrichment.42  The
trademark infringer was treated as a trustee holding profits garnered
through the improper use of a trademark belonging to a cestui que
trust.
48
The leading case clearly following the unjust enrichment ration-
ale and awarding an accounting, where there was a lack of direct
36 Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa.
1956) (defendant bankrupt and no appeal followed).
37 Id. at 800.
38 Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d
Cir. 1956) (no direct competition in defendant's store in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania); Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954)
(no direct competition in retail gasoline sales in Idaho and Utah); Dad's Root
Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951) (no direct compe-
tition in New York City market).
39 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
40 Defendent contended the New Rochelle, New York, store should not
be included since the store was established prior to formal notice of infringe-
ment. In addition the Philadelphia store should be excluded because the
plaintiff did not have a competing store in the area. Id. at 545.
41 See Note, An Accounting of Profits for Trade-Symbol Infringement
Based Upon a Theory of Restitution, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 243, 254, stating that
"the underlying theory has been obscured, if explicated at all"
42 Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir.
1954).
43 E.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259
(1916) (dictum); Baker v Simmons Co., 325 F.2d 580, 582-83 (1st Cir. 1963);
Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954); Dad's
Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1951).
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product competition, is Monsanto Chemical Company v. Perfect Fit
Products Manufacturing Company.44 In this case, Perfect Fit pur-
chased "Acrilan" fiber from Monsanto and falsely advertised that
their mattress pads were 100 percent Acrilan-filled when, in fact, the
pads contained less than 25 percent Acrilan. Monsanto was awarded
an injunction and an accounting of profits even though the parties
were not in direct competition. The court reasoned that "the justifi-
cation for an accounting is found in the principles of unjust enrich-
ment traditionally applicable where property is used for profit with-
out the owner's permission . . . . "45 However, in Monsanto, the Sec-
ond Circuit was concerned with a flagrant trademark violation by a
trademark pirate who on at least three previous occasions had prac-
ticed similar schemes of product advertising deception. 46 Con-
sequently, the court had no difficulty in awarding an accounting un-
der section 111747 on the theory of unjust enrichment.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has taken the Monsanto
principle one step further and has found that the purpose of the
Lanham Act,48 as applied to the facts in Fleischmann,4 9 embraces
the right to an accounting under section 1117 of the Code when the
infringement was not as flagrant as in Monsanto. The Ninth Circuit
in Fleischmann, in determining Maier's intent to infringe on the regis-
tered mark, found only that Maier Brewing Company officials knew
there was a popular brand of Scotch under the "Black & White"
44 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965) (direct competition not a prerequisite for
an accounting), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966), overruling Admiral Corp. v.
Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953), and Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Rohrich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
45 Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 392
(2d Cir. 1965) (emphasis added); accord, Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush
Co., 50 N.J. 563, 236 A.2d 861 (1967) (granted injunction but not accounting,
stating that injunction satisfied the equities of the case).
46 Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389,
396-97 (2d Cir. 1965).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964).
48 S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1946).
49 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968). The lack of competition in Monsanto
was found as between a producer of a registered, brand name raw material
and a manufacturer using this raw material in his product. 349 F.2d at 390.
The lack of competition in Fleischmann was found as between two manufac-
turers selling noncompeting goods to the public. 390 F.2d at 120. This factual
difference, however, has no relevance in protecting the property rights of the
trademark owner in these two trademark infringement cases. The important
factors in both cases were the lack of direct product competition and the
intent of the infringer. The fact that in Monsanto the plaintiff was a manu-
facturer of raw materials, and not a manufacturer of finished products as in
Fleischmann, does not make the possibility of recovery of profits more diffi-
cult. The underlying principles are the same in either type of situation.
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label,50 that the label was not registered with the Alcohol Control
Board as a beer label,51 and that Maier proceeded to adopt the label
without consulting a lawyer.52 Nevertheless, in Fleischmann the
court affirmed the award of an accounting.53  The court reasoned
that to condition the remedy of an accounting under section 1117 upon
a showing of direct product competition was inadequate and that the
unjust enrichment rationale better suited the purposes of the trade-
mark laws.
Following the purpose of the Lanham Act, which "has as its ob-
ject[ive] the protection of trade-marks, securing to the owner the
good will of his business and protecting the public against spurious
and falsely marked goods," 54 the Ninth Circuit has now extended the
scope and usefulness of this remedy beyond Monsanto to include
situations more closely akin to cases of innocent infringement. The
court has now given to the trademark owner a satisfactory remedy,
where there is no direct competition and no outrageous infringement,
but there is intentional use of the registered mark. Such an extension
of the unjust enrichment theory has evaded the previous attitude of
the judiciary that an accounting of profits could only be -used as a
means of preventing further acts of infringement to other registered
marks and to compensate the owner of the infringed mark- for lost
sales directly attributable to the infringement. In its place, the un-
just enrichment concept has contributed to the. development of a
method for compensating the trademark owner for sometimes un-
provable damage to his reputation and the resulting indirect adverse
effect on the sales of the registered trademark products. Thus, the
decision in Fleischmann has thrust the Ninth Circuit into the fore-
front in offering protection to trademarks registered under the Lan-
ham Act.
In analyzing the problems of compensation for trademark in-
fringements, Judge Byrne, writing for the Ninth Circuit, pointed
out that nationwide news media, mass communications and vast
amounts of advertising55 have created well-informed consumers with
preconceived notions as to the quality and character of a product
based upon its brand name or trademark.56 Consequently, mere
50 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 156
(9th Cir. 1963).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 157.
53 390 F.2d at 124.
54 S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1946).
55 From 1951 to 1957 Fleischmann spent over five million dollars adver-
tising "Black & White" Scotch. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brew-
ing Co., 196 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd, 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1963).
56 In Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316
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compensation for diverted sales ignores injury to the trademark regis-
trant's good will and, as Judge Byrne noted, it deprives him "of his
right to the exclusive use and control of the reputation of his prod-
UCt."5 7
In addition, the court recognized that under the traditional view,
no cognizance is taken of the fact that, although an injunction pro-
tects the consumer from future purchases of the falsely marked
product, an injunction in fact does not prevent the commercial pirate
from continuing its deceptive practices by using another trademark
registrant's symbol,58 thereby still deceiving consumers into buying
falsely marked goods.59 On the other hand, the court thought that,
by employing traditional equitable principles embraced in the Lan-
ham Act, a court could determine whether an injunction alone or an
injunction and an accounting satisfied the equities of the case. If
there were direct competition, the theory of diverted profits would
allow the court to award an accounting for intentional infringement.
If there were a deliberate infringement, yet no direct competition
existed, an accounting based on the theory of unjust enrichment
would make the past infringement unprofitable, would help protect
the consumer from future deceptive trade practices and would afford
a method of deterring future acts or piracy by making such practices
unprofitable. At the same time, if the infringement were entirely in-
nocent, an injunction alone would be an adequate remedy.
The Court recognized that there was a problem in adopting the
unjust enrichment rationale in that, by the terms of the Lanham Act,60
recovery of profits is purported to constitute compensation to the
trademark owner and not a penalty to the infringer. If the owner
suffered no compensable injuries, the granting of an accounting
U.S. 203, 205 (1942), the Supreme Court stated, "[a] trade-mark is a merchan-
dising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what
he has been led to believe he wants.... What ever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark; in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears." See 1
H. Nims, THE LAW OF UNFAM COIsrTION AND TRADE-MJARKS § 186 (4th ed.
1947).
57 Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122
(9th Cir. 1968).
58 "[TIrade-mark infringement ... in addition to according legal pro-
tection to the property right . . . established in a given name, seek[s] to
insure that the public is not misled into purchasing or utilizing goods or serv-
ices different from those sought by the pull and lure of a subtly devised
parody of a familiar name or symbol." Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458,
461 (1st Cir. 1962). See also J. WRIGHT & D. WARNER, ADVERTISING, 16, 17
(1962).
50 Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117,
122-23 (9th Cir. 1968).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964).
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would, in fact, penalize the infringer and would be a windfall to the
trade-symbol owner." However, the fact the infringer has gained
the advantage of the owner's expenditures for promotion, advertising,
and customer preference more than justifies the trademark owner's
receiving the profits of the trademark infringer as a form of compen-
sation.
In looking back, three possible positions were open to the Ninth
Circuit in deciding Fleischmann. At one end of the spectrum, the
court could have continued to apply the dogmatic rule requiring
direct competition before an accounting is granted. However, the
advantage of this traditional view, certainty as to when the appli-
cation of an accounting is warranted, is far outweighed by the dis-
advantages of inadequate protection to consumers and to the own-
er's good will and product reputation. Continuation of this rule
would not have been desirable. At the other end of the spectrum
was the ultimate extreme of granting an accounting in every infringe-
ment case. Such an extreme rule would automatically result in a
windfall to the registrant and a penalty to the infringer even though
the infringement may not justify an accounting in the particular case.
A position between these two alternatives was the preferable goal,
and the unjust enrichment theory, subject to the principles of equity,
met that objective. Monsanto Chemical Company v. Perfect Fit
Products Manufacturing Corporation 62 took the first step in adopting
the unjust enrichment theory, but in that case there was a flagrant
violation of the owner's mark by trademark pirates using vastly in-
ferior products. 63 Maier Brewing Company v. Fleischmann Distilling
Company64 took the next logical step and held that the unjust en-
richment theory encompasses cases where the violation is intentional
yet not flagrant, where the accounting serves as compensation but
not punishment, and where innocent encroachments are still pro-
tected from unjust results.
In addition, there was dictum by the court to the effect that the
unjust enrichment theory could be extended to cases in which the
noncompetitive products were of comparable quality. One may infer
from the instant decision that even if the products were of similar
quality, "the trade-mark registrant has been deprived of his right to
the exclusive use and control of the reputation of his product."6 5
Therefore, comparable quality of the products should not preclude
61 Cf. Appellant's Petition for a Rehearing and Request for a Hearing
in Banc at 4, Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117
(9th Cir. 1968).
62 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965).
63 See 66 CoLum. L. REv. 983 (1966).
64 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968).
65 Id. at 122.
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the trademark owner from the possible remedy of an accounting to
compensate him for the loss of control over his registered mark. This
more difficult problem, where the noncompeting goods are of com-
parable quality, would still be subject to the principles of equity and
all its inherent problems of what is or is not equitable.6 Neverthe-
less, it seems reasonable to suggest that the reasoning in Fleischmann
could be extended to cases of deliberate infringement of noncompet-
ing products of comparable quality. 7 Such an extension would deter
future conduct harmful to the registrant and make such infringe-
ments unprofitable. Such action would not be punitive in nature but
compensatory, in that the owner would be compensated for loss of
control over the reputation of his product, the good will of his name,
and the projection of his image to the consuming public. In addition,
these more rigorous standards would still satisfy the purpose of the
Lanham Act in that intentional infringers would be even more care-
ful in conducting their activities, which, in the long run, definitely
benefits the consumer as well as the trademark owner. At the same
time, completely innocent infringements could still be remedied by
an injunction.
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit in Fleischmann has reversed its
previous position which required direct product competition before
an accounting of profits was granted in cases of trademark infringe-
ments. It has been replaced by the unjust enrichment theory which
does not require direct product competition before an accounting may
be awarded. The effect of this change by the Ninth Circuit has
been to increase the protection of the registrant's property rights in
his trademark and to make compensation for trademark infringement
more responsive to the complex and rapidly changing business world
of today.
W.R.U.
66 Cf. Appellant's Petition for a Rehearing and Request for a Hearing
in Banc at 4, Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117
117 (9th Cir. 1968).
67 Protection of the trademark occurs when there is actual or the like-
lihood of confusion as to the source of the article, not the article itself.
Plough, Inc. v. Kreis Laboratories, 314 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1963); Mershon
Co. v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879, 883 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955).
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